Social Media Monitoring

On October 20, 2025, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) published a report on 25 online media outlets that have systematically received financial support over the years from the political party Georgian Dream, as well as from public institutions through state procurements. Following the publication of this report on ISFED’s Facebook page, the post became the target of a coordinated attack. ISFED identified more than 300 inauthentic accounts that artificially increased the post engagement by reacting to it in a coordinated manner with the “Haha” (laughter) emoji. Attempts to influence public opinion through the activities of inauthentic accounts represent one of the most effective propaganda tactics, which Georgian Dream and its affiliated groups have used for many years. The goal of artificially inflating reactions on posts is to create the illusion among Facebook users that a large part of society shares the views promoted by propagandists. In this case as well, the use of such tactics became one of the tools to influence public perception. Additionally, individuals connected to Georgian Dream and employees of budget-funded organizations participated in this campaign against ISFED. 

 

Activity of Inauthentic Accounts on ISFED’s Post 

ISFED identified more than 300 inauthentic accounts that reacted to the post with the “Haha” emoji in a coordinated way. These fake profiles belong to different categories of people - varying in age, gender, and interests - likely to enhance the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of their activity. 

To appear more credible, most of the accounts use photos obtained from the internet and present them as their own. Many of these images are taken from Russian-language social networks and websites, including Odnoklassniki. Most of these photos have little to no interaction history, which also indicates that the profiles are suspicious. Using verification tools, ISFED was able to identify the original sources of several dozen profile photos and trace them back to the websites where they were first posted. 

Photos of Coordinated Inauthentic Accounts and Their Sources 

Slide 12: Fake Accounts Using Photos Taken from Russian-Language or Other Social Networks and Websites 

 

The inauthentic and coordinated nature of these accounts is further confirmed by the fact that many of them changed their profile and/or cover photos on the same specific days. For example, on December 9, 2024, 27 accounts updated their profile and/or cover photos, while on July 25, 2025, 39 accounts did the same. Given that most of these accounts had no other public posts besides these photos, it is likely that these dates coincide with the activation of the profiles. 

Similarity in the Timing of Profile and/or Cover Photo Updates Among Inauthentic Accounts 

 

A table illustrates the accounts that updated their profile and/or cover photos simultaneously or within a short time frame.

 

In addition to this pattern, the coordination among profiles is also evidenced by the fact that most of them list their information in a similar format. The profiles indicate employment at various companies, which do not represent their actual workplaces but rather serve to make the profiles appear more legitimate. 

Most of the inauthentic profiles follow pages connected to Gia Gachechiladze (Ucnobi) and Vato Shakarishvili, the leader of the movement “United Neutral Georgia.” These pages include „i ucnobi • აი უცნობი”, „i politics (აი პოლიტიკა)“, „i world news (აი მსოფლიო ამბები)“, and „Ar Agarevinebt (არ აგარევინებთ)“” ISFED has previously published multiple reports about anti-Western information campaigns linked to these actors. Along with these pages, some of the accounts also follow pages affiliated with TV Imedi, Georgian Dream, and other state institutions - further indicating the coordination and political connections of these accounts. 

 

It is also noteworthy that many of these accounts have a very small number of friends - in some cases fewer than 10 - which further suggests their inauthenticity. Such profiles are likely created mainly to artificially boost engagement on specific posts. A small portion of the fake accounts also share pro-Georgian Dream content on their own profiles. 

 

Activity of Georgian Dream Supporters and Public Sector Employees on ISFED’s Post 

In addition to the inauthentic accounts, active Georgian Dream supporters and public servants employed in legislative and municipal bodies were also involved in the campaign against ISFED. Among those who reacted to the post with the “Haha” emoji, more than 40 accounts listed local self-government bodies as their workplaces. These included not only representatives of Georgian Dream but also employees of mayor’s offices, municipal councils, specialists, and other public officials.